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ABSTRACT

In this study I will be focusing on classical world system theory. I will discuss the
revisions that are done to the system and how these revisions opened up possibilities to
include the Ottoman Empire in the world system. The categories that were created by
Immanuel Wallerstein to depict the world system, such as core, semi-periphery, periphery
countries, and hegemonic states, suggest that a major actor in the system is left out. I will
present historical facts showing how the Ottoman Empire and the Europeans were in a
constant interaction. This interaction took place in different forms that were important in the
emergence of the modern world system, but they were not discussed in the Wallersteinian
model. I aim to place the Ottoman Empire in its proper position in the world system to
present a better understanding of it.
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CHAPTER 1: THE OTTOMANS IN THE WORLD SYSTEM
A. Introduction
My thesis topic is world system theory. My interest in this subject developed out of
the papers that I wrote on globalization. There is a one-world system consisting of different
interdependent parts. When I read “The End of the World as We Know It,” which is one of
Immanuel Wallerstein’s major works, I was fascinated by his interpretation of historical
events and his account of the formation of new states and how they created favorable
situations to control territories beyond their borders. His interpretation of the Cold War and
how it shaped international relations increased my interest to learn more about the world
system theory. Wallerstein (1999:14, 16) stated that after the Second World War, the United
States and the USSR reached the Yalta Agreement. According to a spoken agreement at
Yalta, Americans and Soviets divided the world into two parts: east of the Elbe River was
controlled by the Soviets and the west of the Elbe was given to the United States. The two
superpowers agreed that there were not going to be any nuclear wars between them. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union could propagate their own ideology in the other’s
zone, but they could not change the regime of any states that were not included in their
zones. As a result, there was a polarization of world systems in which all nations took part.
In order to illustrate this situation better, I want to give an example from my home country.
In Turkey we had two major political groups, the leftists and the rights, who aligned with the
Soviets and the Americans respectively. The leftists were committed to the Communist
Ideology, which was represented by the Soviets, while the rightists were in favor of
Liberalism, which was represented by the United States of America. The division between
these two groups disseminated into all stratum of the Turkish society in early 1980’s and it

got to the point where people started to kill each other in the defense of these two ideologies.
Furthermore, the Turkish Army interrupted the democratic process in Turkey three times as a
result of the turmoil created by different factions in Turkish society. These factions came
into being as a direct result of the political and cultural atmosphere created by polarization of
the world in which each nation felt the necessity to belong to either the American World or to
the Soviet World. The propaganda by the Soviets and Americans to preserve the world
system was so strong that, starting in the 1960s and lasting until the end of 1980s, there was a
strong belief among the Turkish people that there was going to be a war between the USSR
and the USA. However, this war, seemingly imminent to many around the world, was never
going to take place.
During my graduate studies at Eastern Michigan University, I took some courses in
which I was further exposed to the world system theory. At this time, I focused more on the
emergence of the system to understand its current status and the changes that it is
undergoing. The world system is presented as one encompassing whole; the advocates of the
world system theory consider the European powers to be the center of mass, with the
remaining states orbiting them. However, the Ottoman Empire was equally strong in some
key aspects, such as militarily, economically and politically, as the European powers.
Therefore, the world system theory is not going to live up to its legacy when it does not
include the Ottomans. I chose to focus on Ottoman World, which was an independent
political entity constantly interacting with the European World. The Ottomans were in
constant relationships from their beginning until their collapse with the European World in
various arenas. I argue that any world system theory that relies on the development of
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European economic and political system will be incomplete as long as it excludes the
Ottomans’ role in the development of such a system.

B. Literature Review
The world system analysis is a neo-Marxist global change theory developed by
sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s. It focuses on social and economic
inequalities among states composing the system. Accordingly the world system, perspective
is based on the assumption that there is one single economy in the world, which emerged at
the end of the 15th century, and each state plays a different role in this system. Therefore,
world system is stratified. Wallerstein (1975) writes,
I would like to designate this point of view ‘the world-system perspective’. The term
‘the world-system perspective’ is based on the assumption that, explicitly or
implicitly, that the modern world comprises a single capitalist world-economy, which
has emerged historically since the sixteenth century and which still exists today. It
follows from such a premise that national states are not societies that have separate,
parallel histories, but are parts of a whole reflecting that whole. To the extent that
stages exist, they exist for the system as a whole. To be sure, since different parts of
the world play and have played differing roles in the capitalist world economy, they
have dramatically different internal socio-economic profiles and hence distinctive
politics. (p. 16)
As it can be seen from the above statements, the development of capitalism is played
a central role in the emergence of world system, which emerged in Europe at the end of the
15th century. The main assumption of world system analysis is that there is one expanding
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world economy while there are several expanding states having relations with each other,
according to a capital-labor relationship. As the world economy expands, the differentiation
between states becomes more apparent. On one hand, there are economically more advanced
“core” countries and, on the other hand, there are less advanced “periphery” countries
(Munch 1994:95).
The accumulation of capital is one of the most important pillars of the emergence of
the system. The second most important pillar is the colonization of continental America and
Africa directly and of Asia more way. According to Wallerstein (1980:97), capitalism came
into existence in Western Europe around 1600 and gained ground to be a matchless system,
starting to dominate the other parts of the world by the end of 1750. The main reason that
capitalism sustained and flourished during this time period was because of the eradication of
the feudal system in Europe. Once the era of feudalism ended in Europe, new states emerged
that dominated the region and colonized other parts of the world. Immanuel Wallerstein
(1980) designates these new states as hegemonic powers and defines hegemony as “… a
situation wherein the products of a given core state are produced so efficiently that they are
by and large competitive even in other core states, and therefore the given core state will be
the primary beneficiary of a maximally free world market (p. 38)” The hegemonic situation
does not create totalitarianism because the interstate system is based on the equal balance of
multi-core-like powers. In this perspective, the system has seen three hegemonic powers: the
United Provinces, 1620-1672; the United Kingdom, 1815-1873; the United States 1945-1967
(Wallerstein 1984:40). Moreover, Wallerstein (1980) argues that the basic criterion for
hegemonic powers is a combination of a strong economy and military, and once a hegemonic
state reaches its utmost power, it begins to decline, giving way to another hegemonic state.
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The hegemonic status is consolidated by the establishment of an ideology and the World
Wars taking place at the time. In the former case, the global “liberalism” was supported to
ensure free trade and the existence of overseas colonies. In the latter case, the first period of
hegemony was granted by the Thirty Years’ War of 1618 to 1648, the hegemonic period of
Great Britain was secured with the Napoleonic Wars of 1792 to 1815, and the American
hegemony emerged after the long Eurasian Wars, from 1914 to 1945 (Wallerstein, 1984).
The world system is composed of three different regions: the core, the semi-periphery
and periphery. The core is populated by countries that have hegemony over the rest of the
countries that make up the system. The core shifts from one country to another.
In this project, I want to look at the emergence of the world system, namely the 15th
and the 16th centuries. I seek to examine the extent to which the Ottomans were another
system in relationship with the current world system. The European World and the Ottomans
were in constant struggle to hold each other in check and to be the sole power in the world.
In addition to these, China was another strong state that was also in contact with the Ottoman
World and Europe, especially through Silk Road. Wallersteinian world system analysis is
very Eurocentric and does not include the Ottomans as an active player in the system.
Although Wallerstein marks the beginning of the world system as 1492, he does not cover
the full picture of the series of events taking place in the Iberian Peninsula, the
Mediterranean, and India. Andrew C. Hess (1973) argues that the Portuguese once emerged
as one of the strongest naval powers in Western Europe before the turn of the 16th century,
wanting to replace the Venetians as the sole distributor of Eastern goods, and unionized the
Christians of the East to attack the Muslim World. For that purpose they assaulted Mamluks,
which was a state located in the Fertile Crescent, with Cairo as the capital city, but were
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never able to conquer it. Mamluks were on a trade route between China and India on the one
side and Europe on the other.
There are some other scholars who also believe that limiting the world system to the
Western World would be insufficient to explain the diverse cultural experience of human
beings. Andrea G. Frank and Barry K. Gills (1993:11-12) argue that all parts of the world
are related to each other and that World history should be capable of covering all
components; thus, Western civilization alone cannot explain this big picture. Nevertheless,
the Western possession of mass media and the globalization of the world serve as great tools
for the Western World to present the historical phenomena in their favor.
When Constantinople was captured by the Ottomans and turned into Istanbul, the
Turkish State became embedded in relationships between Europe and the East, namely China
and India. From 1453 until 1579, the Ottomans developed in trade, science, and military,
causing its civilization to hit its peak. During this era and until the beginning of the 19th
century, the Ottomans controlled half of Europe with intense contact with France, the
Austria-Hungarian Empire, and some other major states in Western Europe. Hess (1973:62)
states, “In 1453 the Ottomans had, among other things, decided to become a naval power.
Mediterranean ships would be a major means by which the Ottomans would project their
operations over great distances.”
In the east, the Ottomans’ territory extended to the Red Sea. In the south it had all of
North Africa, and in the it had north some parts of Russia and Ukraine. The major seas, such
as the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Red Sea were controlled by the Ottomans. This
indicates that the Ottomans were dominant actors in trading and the accumulation of capital
from these routes.
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I believe that we cannot place the Ottomans either in the semi-periphery or periphery
category in the world system analysis. Without giving Ottomans their proper role in world
system analysis, the system will be incomplete and Eurocentric.
In the following pages I will demonstrate that the Ottomans developed different
sciences, such as astronomy, navigation, optics, medicine, and others, during the era when
Istanbul was the capital of scholars. The migration of different scholars from other parts of
the world to Istanbul made the city the center of science. The translation of Greek texts into
Latin in Istanbul helped the Europeans to experience the Renaissance. In turn, the
Renaissance triggered the Industrial Revolution, which helped the shifting of the core from
the Ottomans to the United Provinces and then to the United Kingdom.
Consequently, there would not be the modern world system if it were not for the
Ottomans. A theory that is going to bypass the role of the Ottomans in the emergence of the
world system will remain Eurocentric. If the world system theory does not cover the huge
Ottoman geography of three continents belonging to a world power, it cannot be a “world
system” theory.
The Ottoman state was established by a small band of nomads coming from Central
Asia at the turn of the 15th century. This Turkoman band was a tribe under Osman, and it
settled in the area of Bithynia, near Nicaea (Goffman 2002). During this time, Near Asia
(Anatolia) was divided by many Turkic small states that were called “beylik”, that were in a
constant conflict. Additionally, Anatolia served as a buffer zone between Europe and Asia
while curbing Mongolians raids aimed at the destruction of land, civilization, and people.
Cippola (1965) depicts a similar picture of Europe in that time, arguing that Europeans were
divided and engaged in long wars with each other. Their heavy cavalry, which was the main
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force, was very vulnerable to the light eastern cavalry. Moreover, he says: “For one reason
or another, throughout the Middle Ages, Europe’s main hope of survival continued to be
placed in the large measure in the hands of God (Cipolla 1965:17).” For instance, Europe
was saved from the Mongol’s threat when Timur Leuk was engaged with Bayazed, who
curbed a possible attack to Europe. At the same time, Europe was safe from a Turkish
advancement since the Ottoman military force was crashed and the Ottoman state was
plunged into disorder for coming decades.
There are many theories reflecting upon the advancement of Ottomans into the
European landscape until 1699, when the Ottomans were stopped and held in check for the
first time. First of all, they took a different approach in expanding their nascent state than did
other Turkomans in Anatolia, by engaging mainly with Europeans rather than other Turkish
and Muslim states in the east. Their geographical position, as well as Byzantium
vulnerability, gave them an opportunity to cross over to Europe. Secondly, the Ottomans
justified their incursion into the European landscape by an ideology in which they presented
themselves as representatives of Islam fighting infidels. Goffman (2002) states,
The third of these hypotheses (popularly known as ‘the gazi thesis’) has proven the
most durable and accepted. This thesis states that the early Ottomans and other
western-Anatolian Turkomans had converted to Islam at some time during their
migration across Central Asia, Persia, and Anatolia and had become dedicated, even
fanatical, warriors on behalf of gaza (holy war). (p. 33)
The Ottomans did not engage in wars with other Turkish states but, rather, with Europeans,
in order to create sympathy among inhabitants of Anatolia, which functioned as a source of
manpower to them. Besides this, the soldiers displaced in Anatolia and Central Asia as a
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result of Mongolian raids joined the Ottomans, strengthening their military might. Thirdly,
the Ottomans were resilient in adjusting themselves to the current geo-political situation in
western Anatolia by establishing alliances with Byzantium and against Latin states since they
lacked a navy in this early time. Another form of alliance with Byzantium came in the form
of marriage to the royal family of Byzantium: For example, Orhan II married into the
Contacuzenus family to seal the pact of alliance between the two states (Goffman 2002).
As the Ottoman state established itself in Europe, it came in contact with Venice,
which was a strong sea power engaged in Mediterranean trade as the main distributor of
spices and other imports to Western Europe. When Istanbul was captured by Fatih Sultan
Mehmet, Venice sent an emissary to the capital to build up an agreement to regulate trade in
Mediterranean and in Istanbul itself (Goffman 2002). While Venice was establishing a good
relationship with the Ottomans on the one hand, on the other hand it was in conflict with the
Pope, Spain, and France. Moreover, the Venetians took the Church of Holy Sepuchre in
Jerusalem as a point of reference, which brought this European state closer to the Eastern
world than to European (Faroqhi 1995).
Besides being active at the interstate level, the Ottoman State functioned as regulatory
body politics by creating good conditions for its citizens doing international trade. For that
purpose, they encouraged non-Muslim subjects to continue business by creating specific
courts that dealt with the issues of minorities. We know that most Muslims were pastoralists,
and Armenians were specialized in international trade, mainly trading in precious stones and
silks. Greeks were good marines, and Jews were in the textile industry (Goffman 2002). The
Ottomans regulated a trading relationship with Venetians doing business on their territory by
‘ahidname’, which is also known as capitulations (Faroqhi 1995). When the Ottomans
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expanded in the East, they followed the same policy toward merchants in their province. In
the late 16th century, the central authority in Istanbul rebuked the ruler of Mecca by saying
that Indian merchants had stopped coming to Jiddah in large numbers because they were not
treated properly. In an official letter, it was suggested that those merchants must be provided
with the justice they needed in order to do business or they would not continue to do business
in this part of the Empire (Faroqhi 1995). The Ottomans rulers granted Venetians and other
non-Ottoman merchants’ rights to live in the country and to do business as long as they
wanted. The Venetian prevalence in the Ottoman state was consolidated by the creation of
‘bailos’, the consuls who settled the disputes among the Venetian merchants. The native
local courts were not authorized to intervene in these disputes, but an unresolved case could
be brought to the capital city to be reviewed. Faroqhi (1995) informs us that despite the
common belief that Venetians mainly did business in Egypt and Syria, they developed a
business community in Izmir, often trading with Christians and Jews established there. It is
not surprising that a significant number of Jewish people continue to reside in this thirdlargest city in today’s Turkey. These Venetian merchants were bringing woolen cloth and
glassware while purchasing raw cotton, wax, and leather. With the start of the 7th century,
Venetian merchants carried their goods by English ships to avoid paying cotimo and
bailaggio to the Venetian consuls (Faroqhi 1995).
The trade in the Mediterranean basin between the Ottomans and Venetians brought
the Western world and the Eastern world into intense interaction. The relationships between
states involved in trade in this major sea were sometimes regulated by treaties. Other times
the conflicts between them were solved by wars. The Europeans learned about the spices,
gold, and other trading goods when they did business in the area sometimes called Levantine.
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The trade here did not come to halt even when the Americas were discovered by Europeans.
For instance, the first British settlers in Jamestown were mainly men coming to get rich
quickly by pillaging and trading; they then planned to return home. Even in this time, they
still perceived North Africa as richer in gold than America (Matar 1999).
During the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the interactions between the Ottomans and the
English were brought to a new level as these two major powers came into closer contact. The
relationship occurred in the forms of diplomacy, trade in the Mediterranean, travel, exchange
of prisoners, and even marriages. For example, in 1597, Sultan Murad III sent an envoy to
the Queen, offering her unrestricted trade between two countries. This Turkish man brought
with him special presents from the sultan, like horses, lions, and exotic goods. The two
rulers reached an agreement that guaranteed safe trade in two countries for each side. This
treaty secured a military and a popular market vis-à-vis Spain for England (Matar 1999).
The Ottomans were seen by England as a major power in an interstate system since
they were dominating the Mediterranean trade and had a powerful military. When Charles I
followed the example of Queen Elizabeth by signing different treaties in the 1630s to enlarge
trade with the Turks and Moors, the Dutch felt threatened and feared losing their privileges
with England. These treaties allowed the Turks and Moors to sell and buy goods in England
and to use Welsh and English harbors (Matar 1999).

C. Purpose of Study
In this project, my aim is to illustrate that World System Theory has limitations and
that it is incomplete. I will attempt to show that the Ottoman World played a positive role in
the formation of the world system. Furthermore, I aim to demonstrate that the role that the
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Ottoman Empire, which had core-like characteristics, played in the formation of the world
system is understated. Accordingly, if we do not acknowledge this fact, then the system
would be incomplete.

D. Justification and Significance
According to Immanuel Wallerstein (1999:35), the world system, which is a capitalist
world economy, came into existence in the course of the sixteenth century in Europe. The
system tended to expand throughout the whole globe by incorporating all parts of the world.
Nevertheless, this capitalist world system could not incorporate the Ottoman World, at least
for three centuries. In fact, the Ottoman Empire attempted to conquer Western Europe to
incorporate it into its vast landscape, but it was too late because the new European system
was strong enough to keep it advanced beyond Vienna (Wallerstein, 1999:128).
The Ottoman State was in constant active interaction with Western European states,
and it was a hegemonic power in the Mediterranean, starting from the time of the
Barbarrosa’s brothers until the end of the 17th century. In order to consolidate this
hegemony, Suleiman the Magnificent allied with France against Spain, Venice, Genoa, and
other European countries that were trying to dominate the Mediterranean waters (Bradford
1968:122). Therefore, if we talk about a world system that emerged in Europe without
giving the Ottomans their proper role and function in the system, we will not have a holistic
picture of the system.
The world system theory claims that a unique European capitalist system unified the
world for the first time in history. Nevertheless, Amir (1993) argues that this statement
distorts reality since different states were not isolated from each other before the emergence
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of this capitalist system in the 16th century in Europe. In this study I also aim to indicate that
the Ottoman World was another potent system that influenced the emergence of the world
system. The Ottomans were in great rivalry with Europeans, playing a role of anti thesis. If
we exclude the Ottomans from the world system, then we are going to have an incomplete
picture.

E. Research Question
In this research I want to explore the following issues:
•

The extent to which the Ottoman World can be separated from the world system as
Wallerstein views it.

•

The extent to which the world system theory, which classifies nations as core,
periphery, and semi-periphery states, can explain the Ottoman Empire’s position in
the world system.

•

The possibility of the emergence of the world system if there had been no Ottoman
State.

•

The extent to which interactions and relationships existed between the Ottoman
World and the European World and the way they contributed to the formation of the
current modern world system.

F. Methodology
My research design is that of comparative historical method, since I am studying the
patterns of interactions and relationships between the European World and the Ottoman
World during the formation of world systems from the 15th century to the 17th century. It is
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important to make the distinction between sociology and history since the subject matter of
the former is mainly focused on the types of events and things, while the subject matter of the
latter is focused on a particular time, culture, or aspect of social life (Semelser 1968). Early
sociologists, such as Spencer and Comte, also relied on history while trying to generate ‘the
laws of society’, although they confined their reliance to events that filled their theoretical
frameworks (Mouzelis 1994:32). Contemporary sociologists, on the other hand, are using
historical materials to formulate cogent new theories that explain historical patterns and
structures (Bonnell 1980).
It is important to indicate that historical sociologists create theoretical apparatus and
conceptual frameworks mediating with historical empirical materials. Neil J. Smelser says
that “historical problems have tended to be rooted in specific empirical contexts, and
sociological problems have tended to be generated from conceptual frameworks, though this
generalization does not apply unequivocally to either discipline” (p.37). Accordingly,
Skocpol (1987:24) argues that historical sociologists do not disregard the big picture, while
they use a variety of and the details of history and they are the scholars who taught us that the
formations of national states are as important as urbanization and the capitalist development.
American sociologists started to employ the historical method thoroughly in their
works in 1960 and 1970. The implication of this method was part of an effort to look at
colonialism and developmentalism from a different perspective. Charles Tilly (1981:39)
argues that the historical method best explained the destitution of poor countries since it was
a result of the long, slow, historically endemic process of occupation, exploitation and
control. Furthermore, Tilly believes that Immanuel Wallerstein’s work contributed a great
deal of practice of sociology, since Wallerstein was able to present a synthesis between the
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processes of capitalist world economy and Fernand Braudel’s theoretical Mediterranean
World, as well as how the two constitute one-single interdependent system.
My unit of analysis is going to be the European World System and the Ottoman
World System. I want to explore the patterns of interactions between these two systems with
the aim of examining the extent to which they intermingled as a result of geographical
proximity and constant interaction.
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CHAPTER 2: CLASSICAL WORLD SYSTEM THEORY
A. Why the Classical World System Needs a Revision
In this chapter I will be focusing on the classical world system theory. Then I will
elaborate on different paradigms that have emerged in an endeavor to understand this system.
As my discussion proceeds, it will be ostensible that the classical world system theory needs
to be revised in order to sustain its claim that all parts of this system are linked.
The categories that were created by Immanuel Wallerstein to depict the world system,
such as core, semi-periphery, and periphery countries and hegemonic states, suggest that a
major actor in the system is left out. This major actor is the Ottoman Empire, which was
established at the turn of 14th century and was dissolved at the end of World War I.
Sometimes as a rival of the core states and at other times as an ally of the core states of the
world system, the Ottomans left a decisive mark on the development of this system.
As an inheritor of the Eastern Roman Empire, the Ottomans rose to the position of the
world power at the heart of Europe, where the modern world system emerged. The crucial
role that the Ottomans played in the emergence of the world system has not been studied
thoroughly by the proponents of the world system although there was an attempt to place it in
a periphery category. As a result, a Eurocentric world system theory, which is very partial in
selecting the major political actors as major contributors to the development of the system,
fails to present a more accurate picture of historical events that were vital in the course of the
development of this global system, which eventually became the major discourse for
Wallerstein and his followers. Zolberg (1981) points out this aspect of Wallerstein's theory
by saying that
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when considering from that vantage point, Wallerstein’s characterization of the
modern world system and the explanation he gives of its origins are not merely
incomplete, but demonstrably wrong. The two flaws are inextricably related because,
by minimizing the importance of one major feature of the system, he gives undue
weight to the other, thereby distorting the whole account so much that it becomes
inaccurate. (p. 255)
With this study, I aim to bring to the surface the neglected historical events that were linked
to important developments in “the long sixteenth century,” such as the rise of hegemonic
powers, trade, and world markets in the world system, to present a better understanding of it.
According to Wallerstein, as mentioned above, the world system theory emerged in
Europe at the end of the 15th century. During this time period and in coming centuries, the
Ottoman Empire played a very important role in the history of Europe and some other parts
of the World in Asia and Africa that I will explain further in the coming chapters. However,
the Ottoman Empire’s participation in the world system politics and economics as one of the
world powers of the time remained a mystery for Wallerstein and his followers.
Wallerstein’s (1999) claim, or, should I say, confession, that the Ottoman world could be
treated as another system is not good enough for reflecting its place in this world system,
since this world was not enclosed within itself. Rather, the Ottoman world was part of the
developments that were taking place in Europe, East Asia, and Africa, as a decisive major
world power although it lost its position for various reasons during the 18th century,
something from which it never recovered.
I think it is important to make a distinction between the early characteristics of the
world system and its current features. To treat the modern world system as the same
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throughout its lifespan led the proponents of the world system to the pitfall of giving the
Dutch more credit than other major political powers, like the Ottomans, during the evolution
of the modern world system. The name “world system” suggests that there is one universal
system composed of different parts. In other words, each and every member of the world
system has a specific role and a distinct place in the system. Moreover, one will accept a
consistency of the world system theory across time and geography as far as its universal
uniqueness goes. For example, it is essential to know whether the categories of the world
system, such as core, semi-periphery and periphery, have been relevant from the time when
the system emerged until now. Is the Wallersteinian world system capable of explaining the
features and the roles of all nations in his system since the beginning of his system? Or are
these categories only applicable in today’s world because of the emergence of the
information age, circulation of capital, communication, transportation, Internet, mass media,
technology and some other distinctive developments that are crucial elements in connecting
all parts of the world but that are only peculiar to today’s world? It is not a secret that all
parts of the world in its present state, are linked to each other, and the information about
anything that happens somewhere in the world is disseminated even to a little village in far
corners of the world. In line with this argument, I also agree that there is an international
system made up of nation states, in which each nation could be assigned to the core, semiperiphery or periphery category although the semi-periphery category is not as distinct as the
other two categories. However, I do not agree that all parts of the world were linked to each
other during the hegemonic powers of the 17th and the 19th centuries in the same way as they
are today.
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The theoretical explanation of the world system leaves out some important
developments taking place in Europe that were important in the emergence of the system
despite the fact that Europe was chosen as a unit of analysis. For Wallerstein, only the
specific historical events that are always associated with the European states are important in
the rise of the system or in the demarcation of different phases of the world system, such as
when one state ended in a position of hegemony. Nevertheless, he failed to give serious
attention to some other equally important historical events that were taking place in Europe
and outside Europe. For instance, Andalusia, which was a Muslim country in the heart of
Europe like the Ottomans were, ruled in Spain for eight centuries but their presence in
Europe and their contribution to the scientific development of Europe have been neglected
by Wallerstein and other proponents of the world system theory. These Muslims translated
astronomy, medicine, philosophy, and mathematics from original Syriac Greek texts to Latin,
making it possible for the Europeans to learn these sciences (Wikipedia 2007). This nonEuropean Muslim state was destroyed by the Spaniards in 1492. This is the date that
Wallerstein marks as the beginning of the emergence of the world system, but he associates
the date with the great discoveries made by the Europeans. Not surprisingly, there is no
account of Andalusian civilization by Immanuel Wallerstein although many other European
scholars, including Carlo M. Cippolla (1965), whom Wallerstein cites from on several
occasions, believe that their presence in Spain was a great gift for the Europeans.
The presence of the Ottomans in Europe is the most important historical event in
European history, which was left out of the theoretical framework of the Wallersteinian
model although it played a positive role in the emergence of world system theory. The
Ottomans were included in the system as a periphery country, but the evidence was drawn
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from the 18th and 19th centuries, when the Ottoman Empire no longer preserved its strong
economic and militaristic character. The period between 1453 and 1699, when the Ottomans
were in a core-status country and shaping the politics of the core countries of Europe in its
favor, was not discussed by the world theoreticians at all. In the following chapters I aim to
touch upon the presence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and how it played an important
role in the emergence of the world system. Once I provide a full picture of how the
Ottomans played this role, it will be clear that if it were not for the Ottomans, the world
system probably could not have emerged in Europe as Wallerstein argues. Furthermore, it
will be clearer that a theory that leaves the Ottomans out of the picture will remain
Eurocentric and will not provide a true, full picture of the emergence of the capitalist world
system.
The foray of the crusaders at the beginning of the last millennium was the milestone
in the development of the historical events that formed the basis for the emergence of the
modern world system. The crusaders made incursions into the Turko-Muslim World not
only for religious purposes but also for the wealth in the East that they believed could exist
only in fairy tales. Similarly, the raids from East to West in the Middle Ages and beyond
were done by the Ottomans, and once they were settled in Europe, the Europeans' expedition
to the East came to a halt until another way was found through the great discoveries. This
trend suggests that there was always one general struggle, conflict, or interaction between the
East and the West at the state level, going as far back as prehistorical times. This conflict
took place in different forms, and it cannot be solely confined to religion or economy.
The movement of the Ottomans into Europe started with the conquest of Istanbul, and
it stopped with their failure to take Vienna. The Ottoman presence in Europe lasted for
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roughly six centuries. Starting from the 15th century and lasting until the mid-18th century,
they were a balancing power in Europe, and if it were not for the Ottomans' world system,
the modern world system would not have come into being in Europe. I believe that it is
important to provide a detailed theoretical background of the Wallersteinian model before I
delve into discussion of the role the Ottomans played in the emergence of the modern world
system. Moreover, it will be enlightening to illustrate how Marx interpreted capitalism since
the world system theory is a neo-Marxist theory and capitalism and the modern world system
are two sides of the same coin.

B. Different Theories on the Emergence of Capitalism
When Immanuel Wallerstein started to write about capitalism in the 1970s, there were
many scholars studying the modernization process, development, and underdevelopment.
These modernization theorists believed that all nations could follow the same path from a
traditional society to a modern one. In an attempt to break from this line of thought,
Wallerstein saw capitalism as a world economic system, which is a specific historical event,
but a universal one, emerging at the end of the 15th century in Europe (Skocpol 1977).
Similarly, Marx expected capitalism to spread all over the world with the revolutionized
instruments of production by the bourgeoisie, and he believed that this in turn would change
the relations of production and eventually the whole relations of society (Brenner 1977).
Accordingly, we can say that Marx believed in the universal characteristic of capitalism to be
seen in all parts of the world in the near future although it was a historically specific event in
a specific place. Thus, Paige (1999) says that “historical conditional theory, however, unlike
conjectural or contingent explanation, does involve generalization beyond the individual
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case, if not to all cases, and contributes to the development of conditional theoretical
frameworks, not simply to the understanding of particular historic conjunctures” (p.785).
Marx’s interest was more in developing a general theory of social change.
Specifically, he analyzed the transition from feudalism to capitalism that took place in
Europe. To him this transition came about in two different ways: (1) The producer no longer
produced for self-sustenance but for the market. (2) The mercantile activity and the number
of trading centers increased in Europe. The existence of a propertyless “wage-labor” force
was a pre-condition for these two processes, and this wage-labor itself was a direct result of
the increase of mercantile activity and the growth of towns and trade in Europe. Based on
this framework, the central debate on this issue was focused on whether this was a
“sociogeographical” phenomenon or whether it could be applied to all places at all times.
Although both feudalism and capitalism came into existence in Europe, only the latter spread
throughout the other parts of the world to a certain extent (Holton 1981:837).
Why didn't capitalism, as an economic and social system, develop in the nonEuropean world as much as it developed in Europe? Was it because feudalism did not exist
there? I think it is important that we take into account the fact that the emergence of
capitalism in Europe corresponds with the beginning stages of colonization, whereby the
Western European countries became involved in the overseas trade that mainly took place in
the form of expropriation of the natural resources of the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Thus,
the emergence of towns and industrial capitalist classes in Western Europe was directly
related to the “colonization” of the other parts of the world. This aspect of the development
of capitalism was incipient at the time when Marx was developing his theory of “historical
materialism.” As a result, we don’t have an extensive firsthand Marxist literature on
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colonialism and the role it played in the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe. On the
contrary, Marx provided enough accounts of the beginning stages of the development of
capitalism in Western Europe, particularly in England, explaining it with a transition from
feudalism to capitalism and the dynamics that laid the ground for this transition.
Marx’s social change theory is a progressive one, and it assumes linearity in the
development of social, economic, and political formations in human history. I believe that
the main drawback of Marxist theory comes from the fact that Marx mainly relied on
European history and he did not utilize the history of the non-European part of the world to
the extent that it could have provided him with a different picture of the experience of
humankind. We cannot argue that we would have a more holistic Marxist social change
theory if Marx had studied social relations of production and class struggles in other societies
besides the European societies. I think that people’s understanding of human relationships is
influenced by the society they are a part of and the by time that they live in although this
influence could vary from person to person.
As I mentioned above, it is important to present a full Marxist perspective on the
development of capitalism since both modernization and world system theory are deriving
their theoretical framework from this perspective. DuPlessis (1988) writes,
The concerns, concepts and interpretations of world system theory are all informed by
the Marxist debate over the transition from feudalism to capitalism: from an
essentially agrarian and subsistence economy in which the dominant noble class used
political means (force or the threat of force) to obtain the economic resources
required to perpetuate its position, to one oriented to the production of commodities

23

for exchange under the tutelage of entrepreneurs who rely on economic (chiefly
market) mechanisms to produce their hegemony.

(p. 223)

Marx wrote extensively on the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western
Europe. To him, the first prerequisite of the emergence of capitalism was the emancipation
of peasant proprietors from the feudal lords in the 14th century because this triggered
unfettered commodity production, which was exploited by the capitalists. The second
prerequisite was that the producers no longer produced for self-sustenance but for the market.
As a result, the labor power of the firsthand producers became a commodity to be sold in the
capitalist production process (Katz 1993:366). This development was called the “primitive,”
or “primary,” accumulation process, and its emergence was a result of the separation of direct
producers from products of their labor (Holton 1981:842). At this point, the social relations
of production changed, assuming a new form. Thus, Marx explained the primitive
accumulation of capital not in terms of trade but in terms of the class struggle that resulted
from the conflict between the productive forces. Furthermore, he believed that the
accumulation of capital in Western Europe and material progress did not come into being as
a result of the action of merchants or the capitalist class but as a consequence of the actions
of the subordinate class, namely the peasant (Katz 1993:370).
With the emancipation of peasants and serfs from the feudal lords, the populations in
the towns increased greatly. This perpetuated the emergence of small towns in Europe,
where the division of labor was more developed than in the country side, and this division of
labor was predominantly based on the separation of production and trade. The number of
these towns increased as the disintegration of the feudal system continued. This new
formation in Europe was depicted by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1947) as follows:
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The expansion of trade and manufacture accelerated the accumulation of movable
capital, while in the guilds, which were not stimulated to extend their production;
natural capital remained stationary or even declined. Trade and manufacture created
the big bourgeoisie, which no longer was dominant in the towns as formerly but had
to bow to the might of the great merchants and manufacturers. (p. 52-53)
The vibrant communication between these towns facilitated trade further, which in turn
brought the disintegration of feudalism since the serfs and the peasants could escape from the
oppression of the feudal lords.
The struggle and the conflict between classes are the central part of the Marxist social
change theory. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels (1947) believed that
the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman
and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a
word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried
on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either
in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the
contending classes. (p. 3)
In addition, the class struggle and class relations are essential factors in the emergence of
capitalism as a social and economic system. To Marx, the two main classes that constitute
the capitalist society are the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
How does Marx define class? What are his criteria for a group to be called a class? I
will provide the answer to these two questions before I continue my discussion of the role the
class struggle played in the emergence of capitalism from the Marxist perspective. First of
all, there are three main social groups, classified as the owners of labor-power, owners of
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capital, and land owners. Second, in pre-capitalist society there were landed aristocracy and
nascent bourgeoisies. Third, the capitalists, the professional men, and the middle classes
were included in the bourgeoisie category, and this class becomes central and the basis of the
modern capitalist society. Finally, class was defined in terms of its function and status.
While the former could be decided by the values of the individuals constituting class, the
latter could be decided by how the members of classes lived their lives (Caute 1967:67-68).
According to Marx, the transformation from the feudal mode of production to the
capitalist mode of production came about in the form of a peasant class struggle against
feudal lordship. In England, which is the second hegemonic country in the Wallersteinian
world system, the transformation took place as the result of peasants’ success against feudal
lords in extracting an economic surplus from the rent. The lords in turn reduced the peasants
to commercial tenants and wage labors. This struggle between the opposite classes in the
early 15th century brought about the transition from serfdom to peasant proprietorship, which
was the process that created the genesis of capitalism in terms of the theory of class conflict
(Katz 1993).
How classes initiate a struggle against an antagonistic class is determined by the
realization of a common condition of exploitation. However, the removal of conditions of
exploitation does not necessarily bring about a new form of society, but it dissolves the
contending class. Thus, Katz (1993:382) says, “The triumph of capitalist production,
however, was the result of class struggles that occurred both prior to and quite independently
of the development of the productive forces.” Furthermore, Marx believed that in order for
capitalism to emerge, it was necessary that both and labor products assume a commodity
form, and this transformation was partly caused by merchant capital. In addition, it was
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important that the direct producers were separated from the control over products of their
labor (Holton 1981:842). Consequently, we can argue that, for Marx, the forces of
production, the relations of production, the struggles and the conflict between classes, the
commodity of labor, and the products are important factors in the emergence of a capitalist
system.
As for Wallerstein, the market exchange relations that are regularized by one
universalized international division of labor are the most important components in the
emergence of a world capitalist system (Holton 1981:841). Wallerstein was not the first
person who argued that capitalism was triggered by the emergence of worldwide trade.
Brenner (1977:28) argues that Frank asserted that the roots of the evolution of capitalism
were embedded in the rise of commercial networks formed between Venice, the Iberian
Peninsula, Northwestern European towns, the Mediterranean world, and sub-Saharan Africa.
Venice was a state deeply reliant on Mediterranean trade to an extent that it could divert a
crusader army against Seljuk Turks in Anatolia in 1204 to protect its trade in this region, at
the risk of breaking from Europe. Moreover, starting with the conquest of Constantinople,
the Venetians had to create mutual bonds of friendship with the Ottomans because the latter
had a strong rival, the Persian State, to the east, while the former had rival states in Italy and
in Western Europe, such as Spain and France. It is noteworthy that since the times of the
Roman Empire, no political entity had been able to construct one unified system to bring the
trade in the Mediterranean Sea under control until the Ottomans did it under the reign of
Sultan Selim I with the conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1516 and 1517 (Goffman 2002). The
Ottoman control of trade in the Mediterranean Sea was consolidated with these conquests
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and lasted for the coming centuries because the entire North African region fell into the
hands of the Ottoman State.
If trade played one of the most important roles in the development of the world
system as it is argued by the advocates of this theory, as I pointed out above, then the
exclusion of the Ottomans from this picture would be incompatible with the very logic
underpinning the theory itself. As a matter of fact, Wallerstein was criticized for placing the
role of trade at the center of the development of capitalism and de-emphasizing the role of
the transformation of class (Brenner 1977). Furthermore, the Wallersteinian
conceptualization of the capitalist world economy as core/semi-periphery and periphery is
not sufficient to explain the social relations of production, which are crucial characteristics of
capitalism as a mode of production. Therefore, Bergesen (1984) wrote,
the Marxist repeat their charge that class is ignored and, the world-system theorists
repeat their claim that the unequal exchange of the core/periphery division of labor is
the central fact of the world economy. To move beyond this moribund debate, we
must rethink the whole idea of class and realize that the question of the ownership
and control of the means of production is not just a societal question. There is also
the question of who owns/controls the world’s means of production. (p. 369)
While discussing the accession of the Dutch to hegemonic power, Wallerstein
(1980:46) emphasizes the main role that the shipping industry played between 1500 and
1700, when the production of ships grew ten times over than previous times. In parallel with
the growing industrialization that was mainly composed of ship building and textiles, there
was a specialization in the agriculture sector in Holland, which made it a self sustaining
economy. Moreover, Wallerstein (1980:47-49) argues that as soon as the Dutch developed
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sophisticated ships, they embarked upon trade in the Mediterranean Sea and East Indies,
mainly between 1590 and 1630. The trade was mainly in spices, luxuries, grain, cloth and
some other goods that were leaving a great profit for the merchants. On the basis of this
argument, Brenner (1977) wrote that “what is essential is to see that the basic theoretical
underpinnings for the positions set out by all three of these writers (Immanuel Wallerstein,
Paul Sweezy, and Gunder A. Frank) is the model put forward by Adam Smith in The Wealth
of Nations, Book I” (p. 33). Accordingly, what Smith defended in order for a nation to
develop and prosper was the separation of agriculture and manufacture. With the
specialization of productive forces, the former could be achieved in the country, whereas the
latter would take place in towns. The reason that this specialization would bring prosperity
and self-sustaining growth was because of the assumption that producers’ concentration on
one kind of product rather than many would yield a great amount of products to be sold in the
market.
The last theoretical perspective on the development of capitalism and the emergence
of the world system that I want to present is comes from the notion that the elite classes are
the sole driving force behind the changes necessary for the development of the modern world
system. Lachmann (1990) defines elite as “a group of rulers with the capacity to appropriate
resources from non-elite who inhabit a distinct organizational apparatus” (p. 401). The two
main elite theories, expounded by Mosca and Pareto, rest upon the notion that the
organization created by the elite ruling class to appropriate surplus from producing classes
functioned in transition from feudalism to capitalism. While the former sees the military
force as the ruling class responsible for the rise of the bourgeoisie by expelling them from the
rural areas to the important capitalist city centers, the latter proposed a life cycle of elite
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theory for the explanation of the bourgeoisies’ rise to power. Both theorists see the conflict
among the elites themselves as the foundation of change rather than the conflict between the
elite and non-elites (Lachmann 1990).
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CHAPTER 3: THE INTERSECTION OF THE WEST AND THE EAST
Could the “European” modern world system have emerged if the Ottomans had never
been in Europe? How has the presence of the Ottoman Empire made a contribution to the
rise of this modern world system? The answers to these two basic questions will illuminate
the extent to which the existence of the Ottoman state in Europe and in the surroundings of
Europe played a role in the emergence of the modern world system. I will endeavor to
demonstrate the facts, showing how the Ottoman Empire and European world were in
constant interaction, that took place in different forms that were important in the emergence
of the world system but were not discussed in the Wallersteinian model.
There is a tendency among Western scholars to assign the role that the Eastern
civilizations played in the progress of human beings to a lower position. Sometimes this
attitude among these groups of scholars is observed to such an extreme degree that anything
non-Western is totally ignored by them. To make my point clearer, I want to give an
example from one of the books that I read recently: While discussing the emergence of preindustrial cities, Sjoberg (1960:53, 54) names more than six cities that emerged in the lands
of present-day Turkey, such as Troy, Symyrna (Izmir: this is the city where I went to high
school), Ephesus, Ankara, Tarsus, Permagum, and some other cities as well as several
civilizations, but he refers to this geography as Asia Minor and never mentions that they are
located in today’s Turkey. On the other hand, while giving an example of Carthage as a preindustrial city, he does not fail to mention Spain as the geography where the city is located.
If someone is curious to locate these cities on a world map, will he/she be able to find where
Asia Minor is as opposed to being able to find Turkey, which has existed as a nation state
since 1923 and is an inheritor of the Ottoman Empire? Moreover, someone who is familiar
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with Turkey will interpret this situation as the fact that Western scholars just do not want to
admit that the Turkish state is rich with culture, history, and civilization that could be
benefited from. For example, the Lydian, the civilization that introduced money into trade
for the first time, was occupying the Aegean, and the Sumerians, who invented writing, were
based in Mesopotamia. A study of these two civilization and many others that existed in
Turkey would make a great contribution to the understanding of the relationships between
different past societies and how their cultures and civilizations diffused over time.

A. The Global Struggle between the Ottomans and the Portuguese
There are several ways in which the Ottomans played significant positive roles in the
emergence of the modern European world system. The political rivalry between the
Portuguese seaborne empire and the Ottomans in the Indian Ocean, the Venetian and the
Ottoman multipurpose association, the alliance between the French and the Ottomans, and
the political struggle between the Austria-Hungarian Empire and the Ottomans as balancing
powers in Europe will be my main evidence indicating the extent to which the Ottoman
civilization played a role in the emergence of modern world system. Once I shed light on
these historical events, it will be clear that we cannot place the Ottomans in the peripherycountry category at all. Furthermore, a theory that did not place the Ottoman State into its
proper position would be incomplete and remain “Eurocentric.” It will be more accurate if
we say it is going to remain “Halfeurocentric,” since the Ottomans are themselves a Eurasian
Empire, having first emerged on the European continent with the conquest of Istanbul
(Constantinople), which connects Europe and Asia.
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It is commonly accepted by historians that the Ottomans expanded until 1699 and
from that point on, for the first time, they started to decline. The process of decline lasted for
two centuries, but the Ottomans were still strong enough to be a balancing power in Europe,
although not as much as they used to be when they were a world power. During this time
period, the Ottomans to the west had a border with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to the
east, they had a border with the Persian Empire. Although the Ottomans twice attempted to
capture Vienna, they never succeeded. However, they played a major role in the politics of
Europe that I will explain further in this chapter. Three major seas also came under Ottoman
rule during the expansion era: the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Red Sea.
With the conquest of Arab lands and especially Basra in 1546, the Ottomans gained
access to the Persian Gulf, from where they sailed on the Indian Ocean to curb the influence
of the Portuguese. Although Ozbaran (1994:16-17) argues by quoting from Bernard Lewis
that the Ottoman period of Arab history and the Ottoman’s presence on the Indian Ocean are
not studied to a great extent, there is still enough evidence that the Ottomans reacted
promptly to the new developments in the Indian Ocean as much as their resources allowed
them to. Ozbaran himself relied mainly upon the Portuguese sources that are preserved in the
Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, which are the oldest and most important in
understanding the struggle between the Portuguese and the Turks to control the Indian
Ocean. Hess (1973) also says, “Since, at the turn of the sixteenth century, it is Ottoman
history that is relatively unstudied, a judgment on the strength of this empire in relation to
both Islamic and European states would go a long way toward drawing a more correct picture
of sixteenth-century history” (p. 57). Therefore, it is important to point out that further study
of the Portuguese and Turkish state archives is needed, and it will reveal more information
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about the confrontations between the Ottomans and the Portuguese to control the Indian
Ocean and the trade there.
What is the significance of the struggle between Portugal and the Ottoman State in
terms of the development of the world system? What were the consequences of this
struggle? I argue that the Portuguese could not establish themselves in the Indian Ocean
because of the presence of the Ottoman Empire there. As a result, even though Portugal was
one of the first Western European states to start the discoveries, they could never ascend to a
hegemonic power position. If it were not for the presence of the Ottomans in the Indian
Ocean, Portugal could have established a land empire as well as a seaborne empire that
would have changed the course of history.
When the Portuguese arrived in India, they came across Turkish cannons that were
being used by the different states like Gujarat and Ethiopia, and some others Muslim
countries in this part of the world. The Portuguese seamen were aware of the Turkish
presence and its influence among the indigenous population to the extent that they were
involved in different activities to establish full control in the Indian Ocean and surpass the
Ottomans. For instance, they kept their king informed about the types of weapons and ships
the Ottomans possessed in the area. In fact, the Portuguese’s main goals in setting off for the
Indian Ocean were to replace the Venetians as the sole distributors of Asian products and to
join the Eastern Christians in an attack on the Ottomans from the rear (Hess 1970). To
illustrate further how the Portuguese were trying to surpass the military technology of the
Ottomans, Ozbaran (1994) gives an example: “Albuquerque, who is considered to be the
initiator of the Portuguese expansion in Asia, in a letter to the King of Portugal in December
22, 1510, wrote, “I am sending to your highness samples of the Rumi arms of the Goa Rumi
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and a mould sample produced by the Muslims” (p. 62). The Ottomans did not possess a
more inferior military technology in this area than the Portuguese. The fact that the latter
could not take full control of the trade in the Ocean proves this hypothesis. Moreover, Chase
(2003:134) argues that when, for the first time, Europeans appeared on the shore of the
Indian Ocean, they found that Turks and Arabs were far ahead of them in terms of military
technology and trading. Being aware of the superiority of the Ottomans, when the king of
Portugal first sent his fleet to the area, at the beginning of the 16th century he instructed the
crews not to come close to Turks in order to ensure the safety of their ships. Therefore, the
Portuguese were to fight from the sea and not to engage in any land wars with the Ottomans.
The Ottomans, while dealing with the Portuguese, took advantage of being the
caliphate of the Muslim world. Upon conquering Egypt in 1517, the caliphate was
transferred from the Mamluks to the Ottomans. In this respect, we can argue that the
Ottoman World was another unique system that was not subdued to Western European
powers, but as I have been arguing throughout this study, it constantly interacted with the
Europeans. The Shah of Hormuz, the Sultanate of Gujarat, and the ruler of Atjeh asked for
help from the Ottoman sultan to expel the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean but not from
any other core-like countries that fall in Wallerstein’s category. This is a good example that
indicates how the Ottomans played a balancing power role in the Southeast Asia region,
thousands of miles away from their capital city. This militaristic interception upon the
request of the countries in trouble with the Europeans is not different from the United States
government’s interception in different parts of the world to continue its hegemonic position
in the modern world system. While the Ottomans were intervening in the new formations in
the Indian Ocean, they were also playing the role of balancing power in Europe. In 1572,
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when the Polish were going to have a new ruler as a result of the termination of the Jagiello
dynasty, Sultan Selim II opposed any princes from the Hapsburg Empire to succeed the old
dynasty. Accordingly, a new prince was chosen from France, which indicates that the
Ottomans could alter the policies in Europe in line with their interests (Faroqhi 2004).
The symbiosis between the Ottoman World and the Western World had a
tremendous effect upon the emergence of the world system that was bypassed by Immanuel
Wallerstein. The fact that the Ottoman military technology was far ahead of that of any other
Muslim State elevated the prestige and the status of the Ottomans among other Islamic
countries. Ozbaran (1994), as I mentioned above, states,
The Estado da India, Portuguese Eastern Empire, was no doubt threatening the
existence of various states in the Indian Ocean from the coast of Africa to the MalayIndonesian area. The Shah of Hormuz, Sharafaddin sent a letter to Sultan Suleyman
for help to expel the Portuguese from this strategic place. The ruler of Gujarat in India
also sought for Ottoman military help. (p. 71)
All these historical events indicate that the Ottomans were still a balancing power in the
world long after the world system emerged in Europe. They did not have the characteristics
of peripheral states that were serving as market places and were exploited the by core
countries of Europe. As long as the Ottoman Empire is excluded from the world system,
Wallerstein’s theory will remain a geographically bounded theory. We will have to admit
that the core countries could only spring from the Western European zone and the Americas,
which are also Europe related. The United States of America, which I believe to be the only
hegemonic country in the Wallersteinian model to possess core-like characteristics to a full
extent, is following a very similar militaristic, political, and economic course of action like
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the Ottomans were following in the 15th, 16th , and 17th centuries. As the presence of
American military bases in Europe, Southeast Asia, the Arab Peninsula, Turkey, and many
other countries sustain the hegemony of the United States in the world system, similarly, the
Ottoman military in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Coast, the Indian Ocean, Europe, the Black
Sea, and Mediterranean Sea sustained its hegemony in the world. Starting with Sultan
Mehmed II, who conquered Constantinople at the age of 21 in 1453, the Ottomans’ Sultans
saw the world as being too small for more than one ruler. In order to make sure that there
would be only one ruler in the world, Sultan Mehmed II attempted to conquer Rome and
dispatched his fleet to Otranto but died in 1481 before fulfilling his ambitions. Selim I,
following the same ideology, embarked upon Mamluk’s Empire with such success that the
Ottomans’ Sultans became the rulers of the Muslim World.
Chase wrote, “Like Spain, the other great imperial power of the 1500s and 1600s, the
Ottomans remained at best a second-rank power throughout the 1700s and 1800s, but their
attitude toward firearms was not responsible” (2003:93). In order to indicate the extent to
which the Ottomans were involved in a struggle with Portugal, it is important to point out
that the Muslim Sultanate of Gujarat and Aceh received help from the Ottoman State in many
different forms, which deterred the Portuguese from creating a longlasting hegemony over
trade in the Indian Ocean. However, it is equally important to point out that the Ottomans
dedicated only a small number of ships and troops to the struggle with Portugal that produced
desired results. This small militaristic commitment indicates that Ottomans were in
possession of a strong military, which is a characteristic of a core country. The facts that the
Ottomans sent firearms to the Muslims in Ethiopia in 1527, Mustafa Pasha and Mustafa
Rumi Khan helped the State of Gujarat to defend Diu against Portugal, and 300 Ottoman
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soldiers were sent to Aceh in 1530 to stop the Portuguese indicate the capacity of the
Ottomans to change world affairs to their advantage (Chase 2003). Sometimes helping those
countries took the forms of training the native troops and teaching the locals how to make
guns, which resulted in their capacity to fight back against the Portuguese.
Although the Ottomans were in conflict with different military and economically
strong states in the East, such as Safavids and the Hungarian Empire, the Spanish, and some
other European States in the West, they did not neglect the new formations in the Indian
Ocean. Another reaction that the Ottomans took against the Portuguese presence in the
Indian Ocean, for instance, was to send the governor of Egypt, Suleyman Pasa, to Diu, India
in 1538. Pasa took Yemen and Suez on the way back to Egypt. This consolidated Ottoman
control over the Mediterranean, while it ended Portuguese control of the spice trade from the
Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean.
The conflict between the Ottoman State and Portugal continued for almost the entire
16th century. Neither side could succeed in establishing a lasting hegemony over the trade
and politics in the Indian Ocean. However, the Ottomans managed to develop a land empire
on the Arabian and east African shores, which necessitated a strong naval presence (Kunt and
Woodhead 1995). Similarly, the Portuguese managed to establish a seaborne empire, and
they temporarily blocked the Red Sea and the Gulf to increase their domination over the
Indian Ocean. However, the Portuguese domination over the Indian Ocean did not last long
since it was very costly for them to have long voyages from Lisbon to India and to exceed the
Ottoman ships’ capacity to carry goods. Parallel to this, the Venetians’ cooperation with the
Ottomans in doing trade in the Mediterranean gave an advantage to the Ottomans to
strengthen their dominance over the commerce in the Indian Ocean and from there to the
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Mediterranean Sea (Hess 1973). Inalcik (1995) also argues that when the Ottomans took
over Arab countries between 1516 and 1550, they were in full control of the trade between
the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. He gives an example of the taxes levied on
spices going from Mecca to Damascus as 110 thousand gold ducats, and these spices (the
customers of which could be European merchants) were transported further to Bursa and
Istanbul.

B. The Ottomans’ Rise to Global World Power
Were the Ottomans a more European state, or did they have an Asian state's
characteristics? What made it possible for the Ottomans to progress into the heart of the
European lands where they stayed for centuries? How did the presence of the Ottomans in
the European landscape affect the developments in Europe that led to the emergence of the
modern world system? What were the factors that led the Ottomans, who were a small band,
to succeed against the European nations, which had a long history and experience of warfare?
I will devote the rest of this chapter to providing answers to these questions to indicate that
the Ottomans had a core-country characteristic as far as Wallerstein’s world system theory
goes. Moreover, the struggle between the Ottoman State and Europeans made a great
contribution to the development of the modern world, which is a fact that can be more
explicitly presented once the Ottomans' history is studied further.
With the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans terminated the last remnants of
the East Roman Empire, and they acquired the inheritance of the Byzantium Empire, which
elevated them to the position of a European state. From this point on, the Ottomans’
associations with the other states in Europe went beyond commercial and military
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relationships. The Ottomans adapted a policy different from those of many other conquering
states by preserving the structure of the system of the country that they took over. Thus,
having taken over the Byzantium Empire, the Ottomans followed similarly by utilizing
religious ideology to control the different population and by implementing a tax structure to
gain more resources, like their predecessor did (Goffman 2002). Since the Ottomans had a
strong military, the Europeans could no longer sack Istanbul and disrupt the trade in the
Mediterranean and Black Seas.
The capture of Istanbul by the Turks gave the Ottomans a strategic position that any
state would struggle to have. Located on the two sides of the strait that connects the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, Istanbul had been a flourishing center of commerce. When
the Ottomans took the city, they controlled the flow of trade between the Greeks and
Genoese on one side and the European on the other. These two nations were supplying grain,
horses, and fish to Europe from the Black Sea (Coles 1968). The Ottomans could have
disrupted this trade altogether or diverted its direction to somewhere else when they finally
controlled the entire Black Sea at the end of the reign of Medmet II, the Conqueror, in 1481.
Nevertheless, the Ottoman state gave priority to the continuation of trade with Europe despite
the endless conflict with it. Tilly (1992) points out this fact: “For the 500 years before 1492,
the fortunes of Europe depended heavily on Muslims-Arabs, Turks, and others who in
various guises linked the Europeans to the rest of the Eurasian system of trade and empire”
(p. 2).
What did change for the Ottomans when they started to transform from a nomadic
society to a state was that they started maritime activity. The Turks were known as the
steppe nomads who were good at riding horses and camels. They were very good warriors
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on land, a skill that they acquired as the result of engaging other Asian states that did not
have boundaries with seas either. Hess (1970) argues that as the Ottomans established
themselves in Anatolia, the area of the world that housed many states with strong naval
capacities that developed over a long period of time, the Ottoman rulers realized that only by
taking the seas could they extend their gaza to the northern Christian states. No other Turkic
state or emirates in Anatolia attempted to develop a navy to confront the Byzantium, the
Venetians, and the crusaders and prevent them from dominating the seas around Anatolia.
Having developed a naval power, the Ottomans started to expand in Europe during
the reign of the second Sultan in throne, Orhan Gazi, who ruled the Ottomans between 1326
and 1359. The Ottomans’ success against the Europeans increased their prestige among the
other Turko-Muslim states and tribes, which functioned as a reservoir for the Ottomans in
terms of manpower. The ability of the Ottomans to use diplomacy when necessary,
combined with the support from other Turkish emirates and their people, made the Ottomans
progress swiftly in Europe swiftly. For example, when the Ottomans for the first time
crossed the Dardanelles Straits to wage war against the Europeans, they obtained help from
the Byzantium, with whom they established skillful militaristic and marriage alliances
(Goffman 2002). Once the Ottomans crossed to Europe, they secured their independence
from any imperial control, which allowed them to colonize the European coast of the Sea of
Marmora and, subsequently, capture Adrianople and Gallipoli. By the end of 1370, the
Ottomans had filled the vacuum left by the Byzantium Empire in the area, and they
eventually settled in Bulgaria and part of Greece, becoming the neighbor of the Serbian
Empire (Coles 1968).

41

The significance of the presence of the Ottomans in Europe by filling the vacuum left
by the Byzantium Empire in terms of the emergence of world system theory lies in the
historical shifts in the relationships between the Western and Eastern worlds. Before the
Ottomans were elevated to the status of statehood, there was chaos, destruction, and pillage
across the two continents. From the West were coming the Latin European crusaders, who
disrupted the trade in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. From the East came the Mongolian
armies battering the whole Islamic World in Eastern Asia and Anatolia (Lewis 1990). In
addition to this, the Europeans were suffering from many diseases that wiped out the
population, and they were in constant wars against each other. Cipolla (1965) argues that
Europe was very vulnerable to attacks from outsiders, aside from the invasions of their
neighbors within the continent itself. For this reason, he believes that the Europeans'
continued existence depended on God but not on the Europeans themselves.
As I discussed in my introduction, there are several theories explaining the rapid
expansion of the Ottomans into the European continent at the early stages of the development
of this incipient state. I believe that the Ottomans' flexibility with different political and
social realms, as well as their ability to collaborate with the different states around them in
the form of creating alliances with them, gave the Ottomans the chance to advance into the
heart of Europe. A good example of how the Ottomans utilized an opportunity to advance
their cause is when they accepted an offer from a Hungarian gun-founder, named Orban,
during the siege of Constantinople. At that time, this city had the most daunting defense
system, which no army could penetrate. Cipolla (1965:93-94) informs us that Medmed II
welcomed the renegade and ordered him to make a gun that the Ottomans tested against the
Venetian galley, which sank with one stone hurled from the gun. Upon this remarkable
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success, the Sultan ordered Orban to build another gun twice as big. This second gun had to
be carried by more than 100 oxen, and it took the soldiers two hours to load it. Of course, it
was not just because of this gun that the armies of Sultan Memmed II were able to break
through the walls of the Byzantines, but his maneuvers at the right time and the right place
were the decisive components in the success of the Ottomans. The significance of this war
for the world and the European history was that the balance of power shifted from the East to
the West. The Nations of Archers, which were mainly Central Asian oriented, could not
subdue the societies of the Eastern Mediterranean as a result of the development of cannons,
fire-arms, and war ships by the Ottomans (Hess 1973). A similar example in the history of
the United States’ is when Americans dropped two atomic bombs over Japan reminds us that
a super technology at a time of war is important in triumphing over one’s opponent. In fact,
Wallerstein marks the end of the Second World War as the time when the United States was
elevated to hegemonic power in this modern world system. Similarly, when the Ottomans
took Constantinople, they became a European state, eventually becoming a world power that
impacted the European realm.
The Ottoman state had a multicultural society, which came into being as a result of
the acceptance of different nationalities and ethnicities. As the Ottoman state expanded into
Europe, Asia, and Africa, it incorporated new people into its society. The Ottoman
government ruled its society according to Islamic Law, although non-Muslims such as
Armenians, the Greek Orthodox, and the Jews in this society had their own religious
communities. In addition, the Dutch, Venetian, English and French who lived in the
Ottoman society solved their matters in their own courts, which were established in main
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trading cities (Goffman 2002). Furthermore, the merchants were exempt from some rules of
the religious law established to constitute fair deal in the market. Inalcik (1995) wrote,
In an Ottoman 'Mirror-for-Princes,' Sinan Pasa’s Ma’arifname written in the second
half of the fifteen century, the ruler is advised: Look with a favor on the merchants in
the land; always care for them; let no one harass them; let no one order them about,
for through their trading the land becomes prosperous, and by their wares cheapens
abounds in the world; through them the excellent fame of the Sultan is carried to
surrounding lands, and by them the wealth within the land is increased. (p. 119)
When the Ottomans' and Venetians' relationship deteriorated as a result of the wars between
the two states in 1463 to 1479, Sultan Mehmet, the Conqueror, gave new privileges to
Florence to keep the trade between the Ottoman State and the European states flowing. In
1501, when a cargo of silk that belonged to the Florence merchants was stolen, the sultan
sent to the area government officials who found some part of the merchandise, and the value
for the other part was paid by the locals (Inalcik 1973). This is only one good example of the
importance that the Ottoman sultans gave to safe trade in their territory.
The Ottoman state fitted the commercial Mediterranean world better than any other
state could. The competition between the European states and the Ottomans over the trade in
the Mediterranean tilted to the European side over time as a result of the discoveries of the
New World. When the Ottomans established themselves in the Mediterranean, they did not
destroy the sea ports, the towns, or the inlands that were commercial centers, like the
Crusaders did in 1204. A safe environment for conducting business that could be provided
by a powerful state machine was indispensable for the development of capitalism. The
Ottoman state, by filling the vacuum created by the fall of Byzantium Empire, fulfilled this
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role by regulating and controlling the trade in the Mediterranean. This sea was functioning
as a conduit between Europe and Asia, which were two main business partners.
Starting from the time of Sultan Mehmet II, the Ottomans sought different ways to
revive trade in the Mediterranean. The Sultan took several measures to revive the capital
city, such as providing tax exemption for Christian merchants, gathering different skilled
artisans to the capital, bringing naval technology to the city, and launching public programs
(Hess 1970:1901). Another tactic that the Ottoman sultans used to help trade flourish was to
give monopolies to the European states in exchange for military help. In as early as 1352,
the Ottomans gave the Genoese a monopoly over alum, which was the main source of the
textile industry in Europe. In return, the Genoese fleet carried Ottoman troops over to
Europe through the Straits of Dardanelles in 1421 and 1444, when the Ottomans defeated
crusader armies. Similarly, Sultan Mehmet I gave Venice capitulations to export Anatolian
wheat and permission to install bailo in Istanbul and privileges to the Venetian merchants to
trade in the Ottoman state to conciliate them during the siege of Constantinople (Inalcik
1973). Furthermore, as the Portuguese tried to dominate the trade between Europe and
Southeast Asia, Sultan Selim I, who conquered Egypt and Syria, accepted Khair as-Din
(Hayreddin) Barbarossa’s offer to enter into his service in order to maintain free trade in the
Mediterranean (Clot, 1992). Consequently, Hess (1970) says that “along with the Russians,
the Safavids, the Mughals, the Venetians, and the Ragusans, the Ottomans had molded
imperial and commercial structures that ran perpendicular to the older political and economic
organization of the Eurasian steppe” (p. 1915). This role that the Ottomans played increased
the intensity of the trade between the East and the West, which was important in the
emergence of new trade-based colonial states, such as Portugal, Spain, Holland, and other
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states that constituted the core in the world system. The well-established trade network in the
Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean, which came into existence as the result of several
Muslim states around the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula and their pilgrimages to
Mecca and Medina via sea routes, was protected and developed further by the Ottomans
(Lewis 1990). The Europeans learned about this network from the Ottomans as they
continued doing business on Ottoman soil as the result of incentives coming from the sultans.
The fact that the Indian merchants traveled to Aleppo through Basra and Hicaz with cotton
prints and painted cotton fabrics documents the connection between the West and East as
Ottoman patented (Faroqhi, 2004).

C. The Ottoman’s Alliances with the Europeans against Spain
The relations between the Ottomans and the French in relation to the Spanish
Hapsburg Empire and other European states are important in the emergence of the world
system. The Ottoman sultans did not hesitate to support the European states and form
alliances with them if this could advance their influence over Europe. Sultan Suleiman the
Magnificent and King Francois I of France allied against the Hungarian Empire to curb the
influence of the Spanish in Europe. The fact that the Ottomans sponsored the coalition of
France, the German princes, and England against Charles V by giving the French King
100,000 pieces of gold indicates the level of the alliance between these two powers. In
addition, the Ottomans supported the Calvinist and Protestants to prevent them from
coalitions with the Pope and the Emperor. Inalcik (1995) wrote,
Later on in a letter to Lutheran princes in the Low Countries and in other lands
subject Spain, the sultan (Suleiman I) offered military help and saw them as standing
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close to him since they did not worship idols, believed in one God and fought against
the Hungary and Transylvania, which became a Calvinist and Unitarian stronghold in
the seventeenth century. (p. 117)
Sultan Selim II (in reign from 1566 to 1574), following his father’s example, sent messengers
to the leaders of the Protestant movement in the Netherlands. In addition to this, he
attempted to establish connections between the Moriscos in Spain and the Protestants under
Philip II’s control. These efforts resulted in a cooperation of the Dutch and the Ottoman state
against the Spanish navy in the western Mediterranean. This, in turn, ended the Spanish
influence in the Mediterranean and set off a relationship between the Dutch and the Ottomans
(Hess 1968:19-22). It is convincingly argued that Ottoman pressure on the Hapsburgs was
an important factor in the extension of Protestantism in Europe. The protection of the
dissenters by the Ottomans was very important in the development of trade and scientific
progress in Europe. As Chirot (1985) argues, the Hapsburg Empire, which was an ally of the
Catholic Church, did not tolerate the mercantile middle classes, non-conformist thought, or
new developments, but they could not contain the aforementioned elements in northern
Germany, the northern low Countries, France, Switzerland, and England. As the world
power of that time, the Ottomans’ help to the Calvinists and the Lutherans, as well as their
successful military campaigns against the Hungarian Empire on the European landscape and
in the western Mediterranean, had a great impact on Europe because while the former
thrived, the latter experienced decline. Furthermore, it is argued that the Dutch Republic’s
survival was dependent on the capacity of the Spanish-Hungarian Empire to contain the new
religious, political, and economic movements in Europe. Since they had to conduct war on
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two fronts, in the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe, against the Ottomans, they did not
succeed in preserving their short-lived domination over these two territories (Faroqhi 2004).
The trade in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Indian Ocean in the 16th century when
the Ottomans were the world power, financed the progress of science and technology in
Europe. Specifically, the Portuguese exchanged the goods that they brought from the East
with the artillery guns produced by the German and Flemish gunners (Cipolla 1965). The
same author argues that the Portuguese and Spaniards could not defeat the Ottomans with
these new guns that they had acquired. Nevertheless, in the following centuries, the
Ottomans were not able to develop militaristic technology to cope with the rival European
states. It is noteworthy that the Europeans could not breach the Ottomans' dominance in the
Mediterranean Sea and in the Indian Ocean throughout the 16th century, even when they
possessed these new guns that Cipolla sees as important in the expansion of the European
states. If the nations of colonized parts of the world like Africa and the Americas, had
military capacities similar to that of the Ottomans, the Europeans could not have expanded
there and, ultimately, the modern world system would not have emerged. A possible
prolonged military conflict with the nations in Africa and the Americas would have
debilitated the strength of Western European countries, thereby preventing them from
becoming core countries. Since capitalism developed as a result of surplus value, which was
often extracted from these areas of the world, any state with developed military technology
could have stopped the progress of the Western Europe. As the Western European countries
and the Ottomans continued engaging in conflicts with each other, the Europeans realized
that they could not expand their dominion where the Ottomans were present, so they shifted
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their focus to the New World. This process did not take place until the late 17th century
although the New World was discovered in the 15th century.
How the Europeans suddenly advanced in military technology, such as new guns,
sturdy ships, and the knowledge for utilizing them in a war, should be explored further. Did
this advanced military technology just emerge out of nowhere? Or did the Europeans
develop better guns and ships as they conflicted with the Ottomans, to whom they lost
battles, with few exceptions, for centuries? In the same manner, the Europeans were not the
first people who started engaging in trade intensively, which brought about the surplus. The
trade existed in the Mediterranean for a long period of time before the discoveries made by
the Europeans, and it continued after that.
There was a developed merchant class in the Ottoman state as a result of the diverse
character of the Ottoman society and the large geography that it extended over. The
existence of this merchant class was linked to the network of trade routes that were crossing
the Ottoman land. Also, the fact that this world power was located at the crossroads between
the West and the East made the trade a lucrative profession among some ethnic groups in the
Ottoman society, but it also drew a large number of the Western Europeans to the Ottoman
Society (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Trade Routes on the Ottoman Soil

Caravan
Routes

Starting Center

Ending Center

1

Iran

Bursa

Tokat, Amasya

2

Aleppo

Istanbul

Adana Konya

Arabian, Indian

3

Egypt

Istanbul

Antalya

Rice, wheat, barley,
spices, sugar

4

Caffa

Istanbul

Sinop

Butter, cheese,
honey, flour, wheat
and tallow

5

Ragusa

Istanbul

6

Marseilles

Tripoli,
Algiers, Tunis

Various cities in
Europe

7

London

Aleppo

Istanbul, Izmir,
Salonica

Woolen cloth,
Iranian silk

8

India

Venice (Italy)

Damascus, Cairo

Spice, fabrics,
coffee

9

NewfoundlandAfrica

North
America

England

Slaves

10

NewfoundlandAfrica

Mediterranean

Centers Between

Goods

Mainly fishes
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This merchant class was mainly composed of Armenians, Jews, Venetians, and
Genoese, and later in the 16th century, the British played a vital role in the continuation of
trade across the Ottoman lands. The significance of this trade is that it brought the Western
world and the Eastern world together, as the Ottoman rulers encouraged and facilitated the
free movement of the merchants. For example, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent sent a letter
to Don Sebastian, the King of Portugal, offering him peaceful relationships and requesting
that the Portuguese terminate their hostile acts toward the merchants and pilgrims sailing in
the Indian Ocean (Faroqhi 2004). The fact that these two states were in conflict, both in the
Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, did not stop the Sultan from attempting to institute
such relationships. In a similar way, in order to secure trade against the Spaniards, Quinn
Elizabeth appealed to Sultan Murad III (in reign 1574-1595) to do business in each other's
domains without any restrictions. This request was accepted by the Sultan, who sent a group
of envoys to London to consolidate the relationship with England (Matar 1999).
Aside from the fact that the Ottoman state was located in a strategic location suitable
for trade and the inheritance of the civilizations that were based on trade, the Ottomans'
political structure paved the way for mercantilism. Certain non-Muslim ethnicities could
become neither state nor military officials and chose instead to concentrate on some other
professions. The Greeks were mainly marines, the Armenians were involved in international
trade and brokerage, and the Jewish did business in textile manufacturing (Goffman 2002).
The Ottomans gave importance to the merchant class and protected it with their strong navy
and army when it was necessary. As the Ottoman Empire annexed new territories, the
merchant class found new potential markets that they profited from to a great extent. The
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expansion of the Empire brought merchants from England, France, and Holland to Istanbul
and to the Levant as the Ottoman sultans bolstered trade in their domains by signing different
treaties with the European countries at different times.
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CHAPTER 4: THE OTTOMANS AND THE ONE-WORLD SYSTEM
In this final chapter of my thesis, I attempt to place the Ottoman Empire into its
proper location in the world system to present a more holistic and accurate picture of the
development of the modern world system. Since this system emerged within the geopolitical
boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, it is imperative to discuss the role that the Ottomans
played in the course of the events that led to this emergence. Previous studies that were done
to link the Ottomans to the Wallersteinian world system by Faruk Tabak and Immanuel
Wallerstein himself focused on the 18th-century Ottoman world, which was very different
from how the Ottoman Empire was during the centuries when the modern world was coming
into existence. Therefore, my study is important, as it reveals the crucial historical facts
indicating how the Ottomans' participation in the European politics and world economy gave
rise to the modern world system.
As I discussed in Chapter One, Wallerstein is not the first person who wrote about the
historical processes that led to the emergence of capitalism. In support of my argument, I
presented several perspectives on the development of capitalism that were different from the
Wallersteinian perspective. Wallerstein was mainly criticized as limiting the development of
capitalism to a trade-based division of labor, which he treats as a single division of labor in
world system. This division of labor came into being as a result of free wage labor, share
cropping, slavery, and coerced cash cropping (Brenner 1977:54). Thus, Wallerstein does not
consider class relations to be responsible for the development of capitalism, like Marx did,
although he mainly relies on Marxist theory. Another criticism that is directed toward world
system theory comes from Zolberg. Zolberg (1981:258) mainly argues that Wallerstein
consciously neglects political structures and processes, and he links the system through
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economy and fails to see the ‘system of modern states’ which was developing in the long
‘sixteenth century’ in Europe. He further argues that the alliance between France and the
Ottoman Empire proved that religion, which was a dominant characteristic in the earlier
periods, could not cement the European society anymore. Thus, the introduction of the
Ottoman Empire into Europe helped preserved this ‘system of modern states,’ which was
actually not peculiar only to this long century that Wallerstein chose as a vantage point.
I think that there was always one-world system, and all parts of the world were
connected to each other mostly through trade, diplomacy, and wars. In this system, there
were hegemonic powers that were advanced in terms of military and economy, and there
were nations ruled by the hegemonic powers. The Roman Empire, Sumerians, Hittites,
Byzantium, the Persian Empire, and Macedonia could be given as examples of different
hegemonic powers that also functioned as core-like states. At this point, I want to delve into
the concept of “empire” from the world system theorists’ perspective, since it is mainly used
to discard the role that some civilizations played in this one-world system. According to the
proponents of the world-system theory, the world empires are considered to be based on a
tributary division of labor, which is a predominant division of labor between the core and
periphery. This mode of division of labor is purportedly an obstacle to the accumulation of
capital. The core and periphery areas of the world are controlled by one single political
entity, which is called an empire (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995:390). The examples given
by these two scholars and Wallerstein are Rome, China, the Ottoman and Persian Empires,
and some other empires. I think that the Dutch and the English also created empires like the
Ottomans and others, but they are treated as being the European core states rather than as
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empires, since these categories serve Wallerstein better in the construction of his Europeancentric world system.
The biggest difference between today's modern world system, which we would say
emerged at the turn of 15th century if we agree with Wallerstein, and the one world system
that has been in existence forever is the intensity of interaction between the units composing
the world system. Frank (1998:2), quoting Fernand Braudel, argues that Europeans used
historians to promote their interest at home and in other parts of the world by showing that
Europe was a capable continent that existed on its own and derived its energy from these
dynamics. This endeavor undertaken by historians proved to be successful, as they received
political, cultural, economic, and social support from ruling classes of the United States and
Europe. Moreover, Frank (1998) wrote, “Other peoples like Africans, Japanese, South East
Asians, and Central Asians received no mention as contributors to or even participants in
history at all, except as 'barbarian' nomadic horses who periodically emerged out of Central
Asia to make war on 'civilized' settled peoples” (1998:3).
How did the Western historians and other Western social scientists, especially
sociologists like Marx and Weber and, in this case, Wallerstein, succeed in developing an
argument that the West developed a unique system? To what extent should we be in
agreement with these theoreticians that the modern world is a product of the European
civilization? Did all parts of the world come into contact as a result of globalization that the
European states supposedly initiated, or have all parts of the world been in contact forever? I
believe that the answers to these questions will illuminate the darker side of the world system
theory, and it will help us to better understand the extent to which the European states formed
a different world system and how the Ottomans were participants in this formation.
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To begin, I agree with Frank that Europe was not hegemonic militarily, economically,
and politically in the world system until 1800. It is also historical fact, which I covered in
my second chapter, that long before the Europeans became involved in trade and politics in
the East, there was a developed trade between the Ottomans and India, the Ottomans and
West Asia, and the Ottomans and Central Asia, China and India, and North Africa and India.
Therefore, Frank’s claim that Europe “climbed up on the back of Asia, and then stood on
Asian shoulder temporarily” (1998:334) in the course of the development of the modern
world system is acceptable. Additionally, Marx’s theory that the Europe miracle of
development is embedded in the class relations of feudalism and that the Asian mode of
production, which was controlled by “oriental despots,” served further to underpin the
European ideology that European development was exceptional and that Europe was better
than the rest of the world (Frank 1998:14). Weber, following in Marx’s footsteps, also based
his theory of the development of capitalism in Europe as a function of Protestant ethics.
Weber believed that Protestant ethics were a moral rational code of ethics and that all other
religions of the East and other societies were devoid of this rationality. However, a quick
study of Eastern religions will prove that they are not devoid of rationality as Weber claims
them to be. For instance, a few examples from Islam, the religion that is followed by more
than one and a half billion people in today’s world, will prove that the Weberian categories
of religion at least do not apply to Islam. The prophet of Islam himself was involved in
doing business by being in charge of a caravan going between Mecca and Syria. He also
encouraged his followers to do business by saying that 90% of sustenance comes from trade.
Moreover, Islam treats the individual’s act of working as another form of worship, such as

56

praying five times a day or fasting during the month of Ramadan, as long as he/she is a true
believer.
Second, the works and theories of Marx and Weber, two prominent sociologists, do
not reflect the real circumstances of the Eastern societies and the contribution that their
civilizations made to European civilization. Frank’s criticism of Marx and Weber, that they
analyze the Eastern world through the European glasses at first sight might, look radical, but
it has a point when it is examined critically. Frank (1998) says that
In view of my past work, of special interest to me and perhaps to many of my readers
are the notions of 'development,' 'modernization,' 'capitalism,' and even 'dependence,'
or call it what you will. All are procrustean and empty categories; because the
original sin of Marx, Weber, and their followers was to look for the 'origin,' 'cause,'
'nature,' 'mechanism,' indeed the 'essence' of it all essentially in European
exceptionalism, instead of in the real world economy/system. (p. 336)
These examples indicate that the social theories produced by Western scholars, including
Immanuel Wallerstein, are grounded in the European experience, which does not cover the
experiences of other nations constituting the rest of the world. As a result, the one-world
system that has been in existence and still continues to exist, as Frank argues, has been
bypassed by Immanuel Wallerstein and other proponents of world system theory.
Third, I want to acknowledge that I also believe that there is one world system, and
that Europe is part of that system. In addition, I believe that as the European states rose to
the hegemonic position in this one-world system and as they ascended to the hegemonic
position, the characteristics of the system gradually changed and the boundaries between the
core and periphery states became clearer. These changes did not make the one-world system
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European, nor do they generate a unique world system, as Wallerstein contends that a new,
modern world system emerged at the turn of the 16th century in Europe. The hypothesis that
there has always been one world system could be another thesis topic. Therefore, I am not
going to discuss it further, since I chose to focus on the role of the Ottomans in the
emergence of the modern world system, which is a continuation of the one-world system, as
the advantage in the system shifted to Europe.
Having looked at the European-centered modern world system as a continuation of
the one world system, I now want to finalize my discussion by presenting the ways the
Ottomans' economic and political policies played important roles in the development of the
modern world system. If we look at this role from an economic perspective, I have to
mention that the trade that was taking place in the Ottoman domain was the most important
contribution that the Ottomans made to the emergence of the modern world system. Being
located at the center of trade routes between the West and East gave the Ottomans the
opportunity to play this role, which they exploited to a great degree. The Ottoman policies
towards mercantilism in their realm created a favorable environment for the burgeoning of
the merchant classes that were mainly composed of Muslims, Armenians, and Jews, who
brought the Western and Eastern worlds together as they traded in textiles, medicine, spices,
arms, and many other goods. The Europeans found out about the exotic goods of the East as
they continued doing business with the Ottoman merchants in the Mediterranean, Istanbul,
Aleppo, Bursa, Izmir, Cairo, and other Ottoman port cities. Frank (1998) quoting Inalcik
and Quataert, depicts this situation in the following way:
The Ottomans did indeed occupy a geographical and economic crossroads between
Europe and Asia, and they sought to make the most of it. The east-west spice and silk
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trade continued overland and by ship through Ottoman territory. Constantinople had
developed as and lived off its role as a major north-south and east-west crossroads for
a millennium since its Byzantium founding. That also made it attractive for conquest
by the Ottomans, who renamed it Istanbul. With a population of 6000,000 to 750,000,
Istanbul was by far the largest city in Europe and West Asia and nearly the largest in
the world. (p. 78)
As the Europeans did business in the Mediterranean, which was considered an
Ottoman lake, they developed mercantilist skills that helped them to extend their profits in
the discovered lands of the North American continent. Many European companies that were
doing business in the Mediterranean were at the same time involved in trade in the New
World. In a similar way, a significant number of Britons who did not pursue their fortune in
the army moved to different parts of the Ottoman Empire to benefit from flourishing business
in the Ottoman realm, particularly in the Mediterranean. Nabil Matar (1999) describes this
trend by saying that:
In 1597, Sir Anthony Shirley came into possession of Jamaica, but left it, sailed
home, and from there ventured to the Levant and Persia. John Pory translated the
work of Leo Africanus, one of the most influential and informative texts about North
African Muslims in Renaissance England, and then went to Virginia and wrote about
it; Sir Thomas Smythe was a founder of the Levant Company before becoming
treasurer of the Virginia Company; four members of the Levant Company were also
members of the Massachusetts Bay Company. (p. 97)
These examples clearly indicate that the European colonizers of the Americas were the very
same people who were doing business in the Ottoman Mediterranean. The politics that the
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Ottomans implemented in the Levant facilitated the accumulation of capital, which was a
crucial process leading to the emergence of the modern world system. As a result, the seeds
of capitalism that sprung out of Europe were planted in the Mediterranean, which is not
surprising because of the long history of mercantilism between different nations that the
Mediterranean linked together.
The introduction of the Ottomans into Europe changed a common, long historical
trend that the Europeans followed to access the richness of the East. Up to this point, the
Europeans rallied massive armies of crusaders to get to the richness of Eastern societies
under the surreptitious ideology of securing Holy Churches located in the East. These
crusading rides resulted in the demolition of infrastructures, pillaging, destruction of lands
and peoples, and, other times, in ransack of the very same cities that crusaders aimed to save.
Although the Ottomans put an end to this crusading, they did not cut off the European access
to wealth in the East. On the contrary, as I have been arguing, they created different avenues
that gave Europeans a legitimate way to obtain this wealth in a greater volume. These
avenues could be grouped basically as “external” and “internal.” A good example of internal
avenues would be the creation of foreign courts in the Ottomans' lands to solve disputes
among the European merchants. The alliances between merchant nations, like Venice and
the Ottomans, would be one example among many of external avenues' facilitating
interaction between the West and the East. These examples are significant in terms of
playing roles in the emergence of the world system because they were taking place during the
very same time period, namely 1450 to 1650, that the modern world system was coming into
existence, as Wallerstein argued incessantly in his studies.
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Although Immanuel Wallerstein considers 1450 to 1650 to be “the long sixteenth
century” and the most important century, he fails to give equal importance to all of the
historical events, including the ones I have mentioned in the previous paragraph, that
occurred during this time period and that played decisive roles in the emergence of modern
world system (Zolberg 1981:255).
The Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its power during this long century that
Wallerstein takes as a departure point. The Ottomans could have closed the Mediterranean to
the European mercantilist activities, but instead they extended the Mediterranean trade
capacity by linking it to Eastern Asia, as they annexed Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. If
we agree with Wallerstein that the modern world system’s parts were linked to each other by
economy, then we cannot be oblivious to the link that the Ottomans were providing that
through which the trade between Europe and Asia and Africa took place. Of course, this was
not the only economic link that the Ottomans were providing, whether providing the link was
done deliberately or because it came into existence as a result of the Ottomans’ expansion.
The trade between Russia and Europe that was taking place through the Black Sea was also
under Ottoman control, as the Ottomans terminated the Genoese presence there.
The famous Silk Road, which was a prominent ancient trade route between the West
and East, remained intact during the Ottoman reign. A careful study of the Silk Road will
reveal the contribution of the Ottomans to the emergence of the modern world system.
However, this endeavor is beyond my expertise, so I chose to exclude the Silk Road’s role in
my thesis since I believe that I have enough evidence to show how the Ottomans played
important roles in the emergence of the modern world system.
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The trade in the Levant was concentrated in the hands of the Ottomans to the extent
that in order for the European states to do business here at a state level, it was quintessential
that they acquire permission and protection from the Ottoman sultans. Otherwise, the
European states had to pay large taxes in order to do business, which was not appealing to
them, as the margin of profit decreased. During the reign of Sultan Suleiman (in reign from
1520 to 1566), the French enjoyed the privileges of doing trade in the Mediterranean best,
since the Ottomans gave them capitulations both to divide the Christian nations of Europe
and also to monopolize the trade in the Mediterranean. During this time period, other
European nations engaged in trade under the French flag, including the first hegemonic
power in Wallerstein’s model, the Dutch Empire. The capitulations that were given to the
French by Suleiman Magnificent had a decisive impact on the direction that the “European”
modern world system took although they functioned against the interests of the Ottomans in
later, centuries. But this reverse effect did not take place during the ‘long sixteenth century’,
when the modern world system was coming into existence. As a result, I am not distorting
the historical realities of the Ottoman Empire by not looking at the capitulations in the course
of the 18th and the 19th centuries, since I am not looking at this period of time. As a matter of
fact, my discussion is in perfect line with Immanuel Wallerstein’s, since he treats the 15th and
16th centuries as the most important time period in the emergence of the world system.
How did the Ottomans' political and military involvements with the Europeans create
auspicious settings for some European states to rise in the world system? Although the
Spanish and the Portuguese were the first European nations that started the discoveries, they
were not placed into the core category by Immanuel Wallerstein. The Ottomans'
confrontations with the Portuguese and the Spanish in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean,
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and the European landscape debilitated their power to ascend to being core-like countries.
Aside from this, the alliances between the Venetians and the Ottomans against the Spanish
and the alliance between France and the Ottomans against the Spanish-Hungarian Empire
changed the balance of power in Europe in favor of other European states, such as England,
France, the Netherlands, and others.
The Ottomans' influence on the Europeans was prevalent to the extent that when the
Europeans discovered the New World, they applied to the ideologies and stereotypes that
they developed during their interactions with the Ottomans in different forms. That is to say
that the Europeans legitimized their appropriation of the wealth and resources of the
indigenous population by arguing that they were as barbarous as the Turks were. The
Europeans were trying to understand the people of the Americas on the basis of their
experiences with the Ottomans. This practice was not something new for the Europeans. In
their crusading to the East, they applied these ideological terms, backed by the idea of the
liberation of the Holy Lands from the Muslims, to gather enough support from their
populations. Nevertheless, the underlying motive for the Europeans was to expropriate the
wealth in the East, the prevalence and the amount of which, was beyond the their
imagination. Nabil Matar (1999) argues that sodomy was the basic justification for the
Europeans in the conquest of Indian land and the appropriation of its gold. He provides the
example of the debate between two Spanish intellectuals, Oviedo and Las Casas, that
centered on debasing the culture of Indians in terms of the practice of sodomy. Wallerstein
(2006:4) also mentions the argument between Las Casas and Sepulveda in his attempt to
analyze how the Europeans used ideology over time to justify their colonization of the
Americas by creating the categories of “others.” Both Wallerstein and Matar, in their
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discussion of how the Europeans justified their conquest of Americas, acknowledge that Las
Casas did not agree with his fellow men that the native population was barbarous.
Nevertheless, the main belief among the colonizers was that the Indians were barbarous like
the Ottomans were but that they were different from the Ottomans since they practiced
sodomy, committing a crime against divine and natural law. Therefore, for the Europeans, it
was a holy mission to Christianize the native population or to annihilate them.
What is the relevance of the discussion about how the Europeans used the different
ideologies to legitimize their conquest of the Americas to the Ottomans' role in the
emergence of the modern world system? First of all, it indicates that Europeans have good
skills of using ideologies to suppress other peoples. Second, the different stigmas that
Europeans create to define non-Europeans are sometimes accepted by those people partly as
a result of intense usage of them and partly because of the power of rhetoric impacting the
psychology of the people. As Wallerstein (2006) argues in his most recent book, the
Europeans came up with different ideologies, such as barbarous people, civilizing missions,
Christian evangelism, human rights, and scientific knowledge, to sustain their hegemony in
such a modern world system. Third and most important, the Ottomans were the victims of
this practice of the Europeans, since they were “the other” for them for centuries.
I believe that Wallerstein is part of this trend since he excludes the other civilizations'
parts in the formation of the new world system by relegating them to the category of
Empires, which supposedly were obstacles to the capitalist mode of production. As I pointed
out before, Wallerstein and Faruk Tabak’s article about the integration of the Ottomans in the
world system in the 18th century does not reflect the dynamics that the Ottomans provided in
this new formation at all. This particular time period was selected for the purpose of their
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justification that the modern world system tends to diffuse over time until it incorporates all
parts of the world. In other words, it is acceptable that the Ottomans were part of the
Wallersteinain model as long as they were kept in the periphery category. However, it is still
questionable whether the Ottomans were really part of their system during this century and
the following one. The fact that the Turkish Republic has been trying to be part of the
European Union for almost a half century but each time the Europeans come up with
different pretexts for keeping Turkey outside Europe proves how difficult it is for the Turks
to be part of any European systems. Ironically, there have already been millions of Turkish
citizens living in Europe despite the efforts of the Europeans to keep them out. It is still not
clear whether the Turkish Republic is going to join the European Union or not despite the
fact that formal talks have begun between the two parties.
What happens when we place the Ottoman Empire into its the proper place in the
modern world system that emerged at the beginning of the 16th century? Why is the Ottoman
Empire’s role in the emergence of the world system important? If the Ottomans had not
provided the different settings that I have been arguing throughout my study, would the
modern world system still have emerged? Why have the contributions that the Ottomans
made in the development of this system been ignored by the proponents of the modern world
system theory? I will conclude my last chapter by answering these questions, which are
important in providing a holistic reading of the socio-historical picture of the course of events
leading to the formation of the world system. The true understanding of the Ottoman
civilization and how the Europeans benefited from it will assist us in making better sense of
the current global political, and military conflicts taking place in the geography that used to
be part of the Ottoman Empire.
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The Ottomans' existence as a world power in struggle with the European core-like
countries while the modern world system was coming into being suggests that we have two
choices: either to accept the Ottomans as another core country with its own world
independent and outside of the European world system or to accept the Ottomans as another
core country within the modern world system. Placing the Ottomans into both categories
will be accurate to a certain extent, but I argue that it is historically more correct to position
them in the second category since the Ottoman Empire’s policies linked the West and the
East, thereby preparing a suitable political and economical environment for the emergence of
the world system. During their expansion in Europe and other parts of the World, the
Ottomans never stayed outside of political, socio-cultural, and economic developments
taking place in Europe. The involvement of the Ottomans in the politics of Europe was
intense to the extent that even during the 16th century, the King of Poland had to be the
Ottoman candidate but not the Austro-Hungarian one.
The acknowledgment of the role that the Ottomans played in the development of the
modern world system is important since it will make it clear, as Frank argues, the Europeans
did not ascend to the hegemonic position by “pulling themselves up with their own
bootstraps,” but rather they gained the advantage in the on-going world system (1998:334).
Furthermore, such an acknowledgment will make the world system get rid of its Eurocentric
character and make it the modern world system, which is the continuation of the one-world
system to which other nations beside the European nation also made contributions.
If the Ottomans had not followed policies in favor of mercantilism in the
Mediterranean, which facilitated the trade between the Europeans and Asians and Africans,
the Europeans could have continued their decades’ or centuries-old wars among themselves
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and avoided developing trade further. If the Ottomans had not created alliances with some
European states, like Venice and France, to enhance the economic and militaristic relations,
the merchant class coming from these states and other European countries could not have
prospered in their business. In return, these classes could not have transformed into capitalist
classes, at least during the “long sixteenth century.” The establishment of the European
courts in the Ottoman domain to facilitate and provide a safe environment for the European
merchants further bolstered the trade between the West and the East. If the Ottomans had not
expanded into Europe and provided the means for the Europeans to participate in the spice
and textile trade network with Asia and North Africa, the Europeans could not have searched
for alternative ways to monopolize this trade. Why the Europeans never tried to sail in the
Atlantic, which is in their backyard, before 1492 remains a mystery. My answer is that it was
a direct result of the Ottomans' expansion into Europe and their favors to the Europeans to do
business with the East in greater volume than prior to the Ottomans' rise to world politics.
Finally, I do not know why the proponents of the modern world system ignored the
role that the Ottomans played in the emergence of the modern world system. It could be
because of their lack of knowledge of the Ottomans or it could be a deliberate choice to not
include the Ottomans in the picture, rather to present everything from a Eurocentric
perspective. However, as time progresses and more Ottoman archives become available, it
will be even clearer that the Ottomans had a great impact on the emergence of the modern
world system. Of course, credit should be given to the Europeans in succeeding in turning
the advantage to their side in the one-world universal system and making most aspects of it
less human.
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CONCLUSION
Having the Ottomans in the world system as contributors of the emergence of the
system and as a core-like country makes the world system theory more accurate and
encompassing. The Ottomans’ strong political organization and regulation of trade in the
Mediterranean basin, combined with their location at the crossroads of trade between the East
and West from their emergence as world power until the modern world system took a
definitive form, suggests that the Ottomans have to be placed in the world system theory as a
core-like country or another hegemonic power. The fact that the Ottomans opened up
different avenues for the European states to develop capitalism indicates that the Ottomans
were active participants in the world system, possessing the characteristics ascribed to the
core countries in the world system theory. If the Ottomans did not expand in Europe and
follow politics in favor of the development of capitalism by facilitating the trade between the
Europeans on the one hand and the Asians on the other, the world system could have not
emerged in Europe at the end of the 15th century.
In this study I indicated that in order for the world system theory to live up to its
claim that all parts of the world make one unit and that every part belongs to one specific
category, then the Ottomans’ position and the roles that they played in the emergence of the
system have to be reevaluated. Accordingly, I provided a holistic picture of the world system
theory by locating the Ottomans in their proper position in the system by presenting historical
facts. However, further archival research is needed to find out how the Ottomans lost their
world power character as the Dutch descended from the hegemonic position in the system,
since the Ottomans’ decline started during this time period. Furthermore, a study of the
Chinese Empire during the emergence of the world system will illuminate the extent to which
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the world system incorporated and impacted every nation the world. Or this study might
reveal that, actually, the world system was not covering all parts of the world as it is argued
and that it was something confined to Europe and its neighbors.
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